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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ever to mean all persons in the general vicinity, not just those doing
the same or similar work. 9 The status of the contact-with-the-premises
exception is unclear due to an apparent conflict in holdings.40 Neither
the actual4 ' nor the positional4 risk theory has been adopted by the court.
JAmas H. CARSON, JR.
Wrongful Death-Measure of Damages-Evidence of
Retirement Income.
In the recent case of Bryant v. Woodlief' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that evidence of railroad retirement payments received
by the decedent is admissible on the issue of damages in a wrongful
death action.2 This holdings and the court's incidental discussion of the
measure of damages in North Carolina raises two questions. First, how
far will the court extend the holding in Bryant, which seemingly is in
conflict with prior decisions, to other types of income similar to that
involved in the principal case? Secondly, what inference can be drawn
from the inconsistency reflected in the court's discussion in Bryant?
The evidence admitted in the principal case is difficult to reconcile
with the tacit rule of past cases that wrongful death damages in North
" See Pope v. Goodsen, supra note 38; Fields v. Tompkins-Jenkins Plumbing
Co., supra note; 38 Plemmons v. White's Serv., Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370
(1938).
" Perkins v. Sprott, 207 N.C. 462, 177 S.E. 404 (1934) ; Whitley v. Highway
Comm'n, 201 N.C. 539, 160 SE. 827 (1931). The application of the exception
could leave the court in an illogical position if a case ever arose where one eye
was injured directly by an object and the other eye injured by shattered glass
from a window. Apparently compensation would be awarded for injury to one
eye under the premises exception but disallowed for the other under the increased
risk theory.
" The language in Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841, 32
S.E.2d 623 (1945), strongly indicates that no recovery would be allowed for a
heatstroke suffered on a hot day unless some additional harmful factor were pres-
ent. The actual risk theory would require nothing more than labor in the hot sun.
Compare Hughes v. St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927).
"' Utilization of the positional risk doctrine would have allowed compensation
in Whitely v. Highway Conm'n, 201 N.C. 466, 160 S.E. 827 (1931).
1252 N.C. 488, 114 SE2d 241 (1960).
'Heskamp v. Bradshaw's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 618, 172 S.W.2d 447 (1943), was
relied upon in the principal case. Kentucky's death statute, Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.130
(1959), has been construed to provide recovery for "loss to the estate." Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry. v. Bank's Adm'r, 153 Ky. 629, 156 S.W. 109 (1913). The North
Carolina statute, N.C. Gm. STAT. § 28-174 (1950), is given the same construction.
Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E2d 194 (1946).
'Other jurisdictions have reached the same result; Kowtko v. Delaware &
Hudson RL1L, 131 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Penn. 1955) (training subsistence payments
from the Veterans Administration); Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill. App. 2d 527, 151
N.E2d 120 (1958) (monthly pension) ; Trust Co. v. Cummings, 320 Ill. App. 437,
51 N.E.2d 616 (1943) (old age assistance); Jessee v. Slate, 196 Va. 1074, 86
S.E.2d 821 (1955) (monthly social security payments). And the measure of
damages used is not determinative of the question of the admissibility of such
evidence. Virginia, for example, allows such evidence and its measure is "loss to
certain near relatives.' Conrad v. Thompson, 195 Va. 714, 80 S.E.2d 561 (1954).
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Carolina are to be based on loss of income expected from probable future
exertions of the decedent. Although never formally stated, this rule has
developed around the phrase, "from his own exertions during his life
expectancy," which relates to the determination of net pecuniary value
of decedent's life. This value is ascertained by deducting probable living
costs of the decedent from his probable gross income expected to be
derived from his own exertions during his life expectancy.4 The use of
the words "exertions during his life expectancy" would seem to mean
exertions during that time the decedent -% ould have had earnings but for
the wrongful act. To be admissible, therefore, the probable income must
be due to exertions of the decedent which would have been performed
had the decedent lived out his life expectancy. Under this interpretation
it is clear that .the rewards from exertions prior to death are not to be
considered; thus the phrase would not seem to comprehend retirement
pensions. Such rewards from past earnings would be a part of the de-
cedent's accumulated capital rather than a part of his probable future
earnings.
In essence the question before the court in Bryant was whether the
evidence was to be restricted to decedent's probable future earnings or
whether probable earnings plus income from other sources should be
admitted. By admitting evidence of retirement income the court de-
cided in favor of the latter alternative. Thus the court drew no distinc-
tion between the income expected from future earnings and that attribut-
able to past earnings. The only restriction placed on the admissibility
of evidence of income from sources other than future earnings by the
court in Bryant is that the income must be of such a nature as to stop
upon the death of the decedent.5 The court adopted the theory that a
pension is a substitute for earning power. This may be so in practical
result; but the legal theory of the tacit or unexpressed rule does not seem
to be satisfied thereby. The court should have stated that they could
find no sound basis for excluding evidence of pension income which is
attributable to the past exertions of the decedent while allowing con-
sideration of income from probable future exertions. Although the
court has never held that income like that in Bryant was inadmissible,
the language of the previous decisions 6 would not seem logically to
warrant the result in the principal case. If the plain meaning of these
previous cases is not to be followed, then it should be so stated. Other-
'Journigan v. Little River Ice Co., 233 N.C. 180, 184, 63 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1951);
Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 194 (1946); Carpenter v. Asheville
Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400 (1926); Russell v. Windsor
Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
5252 N.C. at 494, 114 S.E. at 246, "[W]e do not understand that the general
rule in this respect would exclude the inclusion of income from an annuity, life
estate, retirement pay, or other income for life only, in arriving at the pecuniary
loss sustained by reason of wrongful death."
' Cases cited note 4 supra.
[Vol. 39
NOTES AND COMMENTS
wise, Bryant will stand as dubious precedent for any type of life income
rather than pensions.
Whatever might be said about the apparent conflict with precedent,
the principal case does, this writer submits, reach a sound result. There
seems to be no valid reason why evidence of probable future earnings
should be admitted and evidence of future income from past earnings
excluded. The time of the actual exertion does not seem significant.
Indeed whether the income was derived from any exertion at all does
not logically affect what the estate of the decedent has lost by his wrong
ful death because the loss of a life income in any form is a pecuniary loss
which the estate of the decedent has suffered.7 Also, as was pointed out
in Bryant,8 it is more reasonable to assume that a pension will continue
until the pensioner's death than that salary or wages would continue.
The problem is how far should the court go in admitting evidence of
income other than that attributable to past or future exertions and to
what extent it will feel bound by its language in previous cases.
The court intimated that it will admit evidence of any kind of life
income which death has cut short, to wit: "an annuity, life estate, re-
tirement pay or other income for life only."9  Conceivably, however,
some problems may arise in applying this broad statement to differing
fact situations. If the annuity, for example, is of the survivorship type
providing larger payments to the decedent than to his widow it may not
be readily apparent what the estate has lost.10 If the life estate, to use
another illustration, was held jointly by the decedent and another, the
question is also a closer one than that in the principal case.
Because of the unexpressed rule it is even possible, although the court
in Bryant does not say so, that in future cases an inquiry will be made
into how the decedent acquired the life estate or right to a life income,
so that evidence of a gift of such an interest could be excluded. It is
submitted, however, that such a result should not be encouraged because
nothing in Bryant requires the courts to look beyond the life income
itself. Rather the opinion seems to establish only one criterion to use
in the admission of evidence of income, and that is -whether the wrongful
death terminated income or property rights which the decedent would
have had for the remainder of his life. Under this rule it would not
Of course, if the property which produced the income is owned by the decedent,
e.g., a trust fund, there is no ground for admitting such income because it is not
affected adversely by the death of the decedent. The rule that investment income
is not admissible demonstrates the application of this principle. See, e.g., White v.
North Carolina R.R., 216 N.C. 79, 3 S.E2d 310 (1939); Underwood v. Old
Colony St. Ry. Co., 33 R.I. 319, 80 Atl. 390 (1911).
8252 N.C. at 497, 114 S.E.2d at 248.
' Id. at 494, 114, S.E.2d at 246.
" A sum equal to the difference in the two payments would seem one logical
answer. Nevertheless it is clear that where the estate (or beneficiary) receives
less than the decedent would have had he lived, a sum equal to that difference is
ascertainable and should be included in the computation of probable future earnings.
19601
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
matter that the decedent had been given his life income as a gift or that
he had purchased the same with capital savings, salary earnings, or
windfall receipts like remote inheritances or raffle prizes.
If this interpretation of the court's statements and holding in Bryant
is correct, it seems clear that they amount to a repudiation of the tacit
rule.1 ' On the other hand, regardless of the outcome of any future
controversy concerning the source of the income, the mere admission of
evidence of the product of previously earned income is an extension of
that rule.
The second question raised by the opinion in the Bryant case con-
cerns the proper measure of damages for wrongful death in North
Carolina.
The common law gave no remedy for wrongful death since the de-
cedent's rights for tortious injury were considered to be personal and
to terminate upon his death.12 England in 184613 and North Carolina
in 185414--changed this situation by giving to the personal representa-
tives of the deceased a statutory right of action for wrongful death.
Today there are three different views of what constitutes a proper
measure of damages for wrongful death.1, One view regards the proven
pecuniary loss sustained by certain members of the family as the proper
measure. Under this rule the plaintiffs may prove loss of financial
assistance from the decedent 16 and loss of services of a pecuniary value
by reason of decedent's death.17 Competent evidence includes the health
of the plaintiffs,18 their life expectancy and financial condition 9 and their
relationship to the decedent.20 The "loss to the family" measure is the
majority rule2 ' and is the measure used by the English courts.22 It is
also the rule adopted under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.23
Another view, held by a small minority, is that the size of the re-
covery depends upon the degree of the defendant's culpability and is un-
related to pecuniary loss.24
1' See text accompanying note 4 supra.1
'Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E2d 793 (1958).
"'Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
1 N.C. Pub. Laws 1854, ch. 39. The present statute is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173
(1950).1 McCORmicx, DAMAGES § 95 (1935).16Meekin v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 164 N.Y. 145, 58 N.E. 50 (1900).1 Lichtenstein v. L. Fish Furniture Co., 272 Ill. 191, 111 N.E. 729 (1916).8 Simoneau v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 166 Cal. 264, 136 Pac. 544 (1913).
"Francis v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 113 Tex. 202, 253 S.W. 819 (1923).
Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo 178 37 Pac. 721 (1894).
slMcCoRmicr, DAxAGES § 106 (1935). See generally 44 HARv. L. REv. 980
(1931).
"'Barnett v. Cohen, [1921] 2 K.B. 461; 28 HALSBtRY LAws OF ENGLAND § 110
(3d ed. 1959).
" Kansas City So. Ry. v. Leslie, 238 U.S. 599 (1915) ; Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe
R.R. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173 (1913).
' MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 229, § 2C (1955); Macchiaroli v. Howell, 294 Mass.
144, 200 N.E. 905 (1936).
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By the third view, which is followed in North Carolina, 25 what is
sought is compensation for the pecuniary loss to the decedent's estate.
This loss is usually determined by deducting probable future personal
living expenses from probable future gross income of the decedent.
Under this measure it would not seem to matter whether there are any
next of kin of the decedent since the recovery would-under the North
Carolina view2 01-escheat to the state as would intestate property where
decedent leaves no relatives.
The reason a question about the North Carolina measure is raised
by the Bryant opinion is that the court cites early North Carolina cases
in conflict with the "loss to the estate" rule. These early cases are to
the effect that the proper measure of damages is the loss to the family
of the decedent. In Collier v. Arrington,2 7 the court said that the only
question was "how much has the plaintiff [widow] lost by the death of
the person injured." And in Kesler v. Smith2 8 the language used was,
"what was the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage to the
family of the deceased from the continuance of his life." There are
several other early cases using similar language,29 and there is even
judicial expression to the effect that such cases were following the Eng-
lish rule.30
Another and more recent group of cases employ the phrase "loss to
the estate -of the decedent" as stating the proper measure.31 In other
recent cases, however, the court seems to have returned to the principle
of "loss to the family." Hanks v. Norfolk & W. Ry.3 2 was such a case;
the court allowed evidence of a guilty plea by the decedent in a non-
support action on the theory that it showed decedent's character. It was
the defendant's intention, thus to show how little the decedent's family
had lost, in a pecuniary sense, by the decedent's death. In Lamm v.
Lorbacher 3 the trial judge charged the jury to "arrive at the pecuniary
'"McCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 229 N.C. 57, 47 S.E2d 532 (1948);
Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400 (1926);
Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961; 36 S.E. 191 (1900). It is in-
teresting to note that while the proceeds of a wrongful death recovery are to be
disbursed in accordance with the statute of distribution, such funds are not part
of the decedent's estate so as to be subject to decedent's debts. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§28-173 (1950).
" McCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 229 N.C. 57, 47 S.E.2d 532 (1948);
Warner v. Western N.C. R.R., 94 N.C. 250 (1886).
27 61 N.C. 356, 358 (1867).
-8 66 N.C. 154, 157 (1872).20 E.g., Carter v. Railroad, 139 N.C. 499, 52 SZE. 642 (1905); Mendenhall v.
North Carolina R.R., 123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480 (1898) ; Burton v. Wilmington &
Weldon R.R., 82 N.C. 505 (1880).
" Purnell v. Rocldngham R.R., 190 N.C. 573, 130 S.E. 313 (1925).
E.g., Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400(1926) ; Horton v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 175 N.C. 472, 95 S.E. 883 (1918).
8 230 N.C. 179, 52 S.E.2d 717 (1949). This case and the earlier North Caro-
lina decisions on this point are discussed in Note, 28 N.C.L. REv. 106 (1949).
" 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
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worth of the deceased to her family or estate."3 4 The court held that
the use of the word "family" in the connection in which it was used may
be understood as meaning "estate" and thus the charge was not in error.
It is doubtful that the jury understood the word in other than its com-
mon meaning. Then in Armentrout v. Hughess the court said, "Our
statute has from its passage been interpreted to accord with the interpre-
tation given by the English courts to Lord Campbell's Act."30; This
broad statement evidently overlooked Russell v. Windsor Steamboat
Co.,37 wherein it was pointed out that North Carolina has a measure of
damages different from that used by the English courts.
In the principal case the court quotes with approval the language of
three of the early North Carolina cases previously mentioned herein.38
Also the court cites30 an English case which held that a father who had
a reasonable expectation of benefit from the continuance of his son's life
could maintain an action for damages for his wrongful death. This
result seems quite proper under the English or "loss to the family" rule,
but it could not follow from the North Carolina or "loss to the estate"
rule.
It is not clear what the court sought to achieve in Bryant by its col-
lection of seemingly contradictory authority, but it is possible that a
change in the law is contemplated. There is, however, an expression
in the opinion to the effect that no former opinion is sought to be altered,
modified, or overruled.40 In spite of this disclaimer there does seem
to be a shift towards the English or majority rule. There also possibly
emerges a trend away from the judicially self-imposed test of "income
derived from deceased's own exertions" and back to the language of
the statute itself which is: "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
injury, resulting from such death." 41
In summary it can only be said that Bryant perpetuates the confusion
surrounding this area of the law, even if it does not alter precedent.
OLIVER W. ALPEIN
" Id. at 729, 71 S.E2d at 50.247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958).
" Id. at 632, 101 S.E.2d at 795.
27 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
"Mendenhall v. North Carolina RR, 123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480 (1898);
Kesler v. Smith, 66 N.C. 154 (1872) ; Collier v. Arrington, 61 N.C. 356 (1867).
29 252 N.C. at 496, 114 S.E.2d at 247.0 Id. at 498, 114 S.E.2d at 248.
"IN.C. Gax. STAT. § 28-174 (1950).
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